Paperlane

no. 13 · Wednesday 11 November 2026

On Scarf's theorem for Generalized Cooperative Games

Mikhail V. Bludov and Oleg R. Musin

math.CO · v5

Abstract

In this paper, we study a generalization of cooperative games with non-transferable utility. Our model is motivated by Shapley's proof of Scarf's theorem, which revealed a deep connection between KKM-type theorems and cooperative games. In recent decades, further developments have established deeper connections between algebraic topology and combinatorial KKM-type fixed-point theorems. We explore the consequences of these developments for cooperative game theory. In our model, coalitions are replaced by firms, each represented by a resource vector and a set of feasible payoff vectors in a common payoff space. We define the core and fractional core for these games and relate their nonemptiness to homotopy invariants of covers associated with the game. Consequently, we obtain a Scarf-type theorem for generalized cooperative games. This framework allows us to model cooperative games with threats and political games.

fields
Combinatorics
pdf ↗ page arXiv:2501.05802 ↗