Paperlane

no. 14 · Friday 13 November 2026

Sequential Membership Inference Attacks

Thomas Michel, Debabrota Basu and Emilie Kaufmann

math.ST · v3 · code

Abstract

Modern AI models are not static. They go through multiple updates in their lifecycles. We propose to design Sequential Membership Inference (SeMI) attacks leading to tighter privacy audits by exploiting the sequence of models and injecting a target canary at a controlled insertion time. First, for empirical mean computation, we develop SeMI*, an optimal SeMI attack to identify the presence of a target inserted at a specific insertion step. We derive the power of SeMI* to show that accessing the model sequence yields more powerful MI attacks than scrutinising only the final model. SeMI* exhibits an isolation property. Its power depends on the statistics obtained right before and after insertion of the target. Leveraging this insight, we develop practical white-box (accessing model gradients) and black-box (accessing loss) SeMI attacks against models trained with (DP-)SGD. Across datasets and models trained with (DP-)SGD, our experiments show that SeMI attacks achieve higher power than snapshot-independent baselines, and yield tighter privacy audits thanks to (a) control over the insertion time and (b) observations across the model sequence. Code is available at https://github.com/Thomick/pysemi.

code
github.com/Thomick/pysemi
comments
Accepted at NeurIPS 2026. Camera-ready version. Code at https://github.com/Thomick/pysemi
fields
Statistics Theory
pdf ↗ page arXiv:2602.16596 ↗