no. 3 · Tuesday 27 October 2026
Neuromorphic Realization of Best Response in Finite-Action Games
Abstract
We develop a mechanistic dynamical-systems formulation of best response in finite-action games with relational structure on the action set. The proposed neuromorphic decision dynamics realize best response as the stable outcome of an internal state-space process, rather than as an externally imposed choice rule. This provides a deterministic account of commitment formation, symmetry resolution through basins of attraction, and hysteresis and decision persistence under perturbations. For action spaces with circulant coupling, we prove using Lyapunov-Schmidt reduction that the action-coupling operator determines which components of evidence govern decision formation. We further show that the dynamics implicitly compute a geometry-aware utility, converge exponentially to the corresponding best response, and switch only when evidence is sufficiently strong. In contrast, supplying the same geometry-aware utility directly to logit dynamics does not recover these properties, showing that relational structure must be embedded in the decision mechanism itself. We illustrate the framework in a repeated coverage game, prove that the induced game is an exact potential game, and show that its Nash equilibria are reached by the neuromorphic decision dynamics.
- fields
- Dynamical Systems, Optimization and Control