Paperlane

no. 16 · Tuesday 17 November 2026

Uniqueness of synchronized stationary equilibria in the Kuramoto mean field game

Sebastian Munoz

math.AP · v2

Abstract

The Kuramoto mean field game describes a population of oscillators which, above a critical value of the interaction parameter, form synchronized Nash equilibria. We show that these synchronized equilibria are unique, up to rotations, for each value of the parameter. Moreover, the unique equilibrium depends smoothly on the interaction parameter, and converges smoothly to the uniform distribution when the parameter approaches its critical value. These statements are direct consequences of our main technical result: the self-consistency map is strictly concave, as was previously conjectured by Carmona, Cormier, and Soner. In the proof, we decompose the second derivative of the self-consistency map as the sum of two moments, and prove that each of them is negative by using symmetrization arguments to exploit hidden monotonicity and skewness properties of the equilibria.

comments
v2: Improved exposition throughout and minor simplifications to the proofs. Results unchanged
fields
Analysis of PDEs, Optimization and Control
pdf ↗ page arXiv:2605.13783 ↗