Paperlane

no. 16 · Tuesday 17 November 2026

Equilibria for Time-inconsistent Regular-singular Control Problems with Non-exponential Discount

Yuting Jia, Zongxia Liang and Xiaodong Luo

math.OC · v3

Abstract

This paper studies a time-inconsistent mixed regular-singular control problem in continuous time with non-exponential discount. We seek time-consistent equilibria in an intrapersonal game framework and propose two novel definitions of regular-singular equilibrium where both regular and singular controls are unified via control laws. The standard equilibrium definition allows simultaneous perturbations of both controls, while a mild definition restricts perturbations to one control at a time. Verification theorems providing sufficient conditions are established for both definitions. We illustrate the applicability of the theory through an effort and dividend problem. First, a mild equilibrium is constructed, yet not a standard equilibrium, highlighting the distinction between the two definitions. Moreover, we derive semi-explicit threshold-type equilibria under both a mixture of exponential discount functions and a pseudo-exponential discount function. In both cases, the convexity of the value function is rigorously established, the equilibrium conditions are verified, and the existence of the effort and dividend thresholds is proved. Numerical results reveal the impacts of exogenous parameters on the effort and dividend thresholds and the equilibrium value function, along with their economic implications.

fields
Optimization and Control
pdf ↗ page arXiv:2609.08877 ↗